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Abstract 
In this paper I offer an account of the dependence relation between perception of change and the subjective flow of time that is 
consistent with some extant empirical evidence from priming by unconscious change.  This view is inspired by the one offered by 
William James, but it is articulated in the framework of contemporary functionalist accounts of mental qualities and higher-order 
theories of consciousness.  An additional advantage of this account of the relationship between perception of change and 
subjective time is that is makes sense of instances where we are not consciously aware of changes but still experience the flow of 
time. 
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1. Introduction 
William James observed that “empty our minds as we may, some form of changing process remains for us to feel, 
and cannot be expelled.  And along with the sense of the process and its rhythm goes the sense of the length of time 
it lasts.  Awareness of change is thus the condition on which our perception of time’s flow depends” (James, 1890, 
Vol. I, p. 621).  The connection between awareness of change and the perception of time’s flow can be understood in 
several ways, but the most appealing is to think of perceived changes as the boundaries of perceived intervals of 
time, i.e., perceived durations.  On this view, awareness of change at time n followed by awareness of change at time 
n+2 seconds marks the boundaries of a perceived temporal interval with a duration of 2 seconds.  Without 
perception of duration time would not appear to flow at all and this is why the perception of time’s flow is dependent 
on awareness of change:  perception of duration depends on perception in change. 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 30 2093-1738. 
E-mail address: michal.klincewicz@cms.hu-berlin.de 
1877-0428 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of the International Conference on Timing and Time Perception.  
                                                          
 Michał Klincewicz / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 00 (2014) 000–000 2 
James’ idea can be useful in understanding the relationship between change perception and the perception of time 
in general.  Durations, timing, and the flow of time can all be understood as piggybacking in some way on 
antecedent instances of perceived change.  On this view, represented changes are the building blocks out of which 
mental representations of time are constructed.    
However appealing this idea it runs counter to some of what we know about change perception from 
neuroscience.  In this paper I offer an account of the relationship between perceived change and subjective time that 
can both do justice to James’ original idea and also sit comfortably with that evidence. 
2. Time depending on change 
2.1. The constitutive view 
What could it mean for the awareness of time’s flow to depend on awareness of change?  The view that James 
himself seems to endorse is that without awareness of change there would be no subjective flow of time at all.  Let 
us call this particular understanding of the relationship between awareness of change and subjective time the 
constitutive view. 
The constitutive view may appear plausible.  Consider the example of a person put in a situation where there is 
no sensory input of any kind, including no sense of the beating of one’s heart, no sense of one’s breathing, nor even 
the sense of the relative locations of one’s body parts.  Would subjective time cease to flow for them entirely?   
Arguably, no.  A person that perceives no changes because they are deprived of any sensory input would still be 
able to notice the succession of their thoughts, doubts, and so on.  And what if we could take away even those?  
Then indeed it would appear that the person would not be aware of anything and hence would have no basis on 
which to form the judgment that time is passing. 
But even if the constitutive view is conceptually sound, it does not fit comfortably with phenomena such as 
change blindness and priming.  Change blindness occurs when changes in the world occur simultaneously with a 
disruption in the flow of visual information.  These disruptions can range from substantial (eye saccades, shifts of 
the entire display) to minute (eye blinks, flickers, mud splashes in the display) (Grimes 1996, Henderson and 
Hollingworth, 1999, Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997, Simons & Levin, 1997).  Priming occurs when perceptually 
processed information becomes available to psychological processes without the subject being consciously aware of 
that information (Marcel 1983, Wiggs & Martin 1998, Ochsner, Chiu, & Shacter 1994).  Priming demonstrates that 
we can perceive things without being aware that we do. 
There is now substantial evidence of priming during change blindness (Fernandez-Duque & Thornton, 2000, 
2003, Laloyaux, Destrebecqz, & Cleermans, 2006, Silverman & Mack, 2006, Caudek & Domini, 2012).  These 
studies and others like them demonstrate that perception of change and conscious experience of change sometimes 
come apart.  Furthermore, there is now evidence that unconsciously perceived changes have no effect on subjective 
time at all (Herbst, Javadi, & Busch, 2012).   
This evidence puts pressure on the constitutive view, which assumes that awareness of change and conscious 
experience of time never come apart because the latter depends, in a strong sense, on the former.  Priming during 
change blindness shows that are situations in which the subjective flow of time is not determined by our awareness 
of change.  And if that is true, then the relationship between awareness of change and subjective time is weaker than 
James’ initial idea might suggest. 
2.2. The causal view 
On the weaker understanding of the dependence relationship, awareness of change may influence the subjective 
flow of time, but it does not constitute it.  This makes room for priming during change blindness, where we are 
aware of change and that does not affect our conscious experience.  Let us call this the causal view.   
While this understanding of James’ original idea sits more comfortably with neuroscience, it loses some of its 
explanatory power.  We are left without a complete account of the subjective flow of time and also without a clear 
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understanding of the dependence relationship between awareness of change and conscious experience of time.  
When does awareness of change affect subjective time?  In what way?  Why? 
In the following section I will not aim to answer these ambitious questions.  I offer instead a version of the causal 
view that adopts the Jamesian idea of dependence between awareness of change and subjective time, but also sits 
comfortably with neuroscience.  With that in place, perhaps the more ambitious questions can be addressed in the 
future.  Importantly, this account will only address perceived changes and will not encompass the awareness of the 
succession of one’s thoughts, doubts, and so on, which might be the basis for the subjective sense of the flow of time 
when there is no perceptual input at all. 
3. Awareness of change and the subjective flow of time 
3.1. Mental qualities without consciousness 
So how can change be represented without consciousness? One way of developing such a view is to first look to 
a functionalist conception of mental qualities developed in the philosophy of mind (Lewis, 1972, Sellars, 1956, 
Shoemaker, 1975).  The fundamental insight of that tradition is that mental qualities, such as red or sour, can be 
fully characterized by their functional role in the mental economy of an organism without reference to the way that 
they seem to us in conscious experience.  An account of change perception can then be made in terms of mental 
qualities, functionally understood. 
The main idea here is that in order for an organism to discriminate among perceptible properties, the relations 
between them have to be reflected, in some way, by the relations among properties of the organism.  Otherwise the 
organism would routinely get things wrong about what perceptible property they are interacting with.   
There are several ways of characterizing perceptible properties.  One is to appeal to the physical properties of 
objects and their relations.  For example, electromagnetic wavelengths of the visible color spectrum and their 
relations would be the set of visual perceptible properties for humans.  The result would be an asymmetrical three-
dimensional space that roughly corresponds to the ‘CIE 1931 XYZ color space’ (Smith & Guild, 1931).  Mental 
colors, on the other hand, would then reflect these relations.  This is, roughly, Austen Clark’s  theory of mental 
qualities (Clark 1993, 2000).  Perceptible properties can also be characterized in terms of the discriminations 
themselves.  On this sort of view, the possible perceptual discriminations that an organism can make will determine 
what the perceptible properties are.  This is approach taken by David Rosenthal (Rosenthal, 1991, 2010).   
Whatever our view on perceptible properties, mental qualities such as red, sour, and so on, will be the properties 
of an organism in virtue of which it can make perceptual discriminations.  Sets of these properties will form 
modality specific families, which in turn define spaces of relations.  These modality-specific quality spaces define 
every mental quality without reference to their phenomenal character, that is, without reference to the way that they 
appear in conscious experience. 
The functionalist model of mental qualities can be applied across modalities and across perceptual dimensions.  
Any set of possible discriminations that can be characterized by similarities and differences can be organized into 
families and spaces.  The model fits easily with spatial properties, such as location, shape, and size (Meehan, 2007) 
and even with pains (Kostic, 2011).     
3.2. Awareness of change without consciousness 
Now that we know how to understand mental qualities without reference to their phenomenal character, that is, to 
the way that they appear in conscious experience, we can build an account of unconscious change perception.  One 
way to go here is to say that change has its own mental quality space defined by the similarities and differences 
between changes that we can discriminate.  On this view, we perceive a change in the environment in virtue of 
representing it as a change, whatever that may mean.   
This view might be appealing at first.  When we consciously perceive some change in the environment it appears 
to be a dynamic process of temporal becoming.  This comports with some views on the nature of time, which defend 
the view that the passage of time is an irreducible feature of reality (e.g. Maudlin 2007, pp. 108-12).  Our 
phenomenology reflects this feature in the dynamism of our subjective sense of time’s flow.   
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But in the present context this is a bad way to go.  The main motivation for an account of change perception that 
relies on its own distinct mental quality is the phenomenology of temporal becoming.  However, the functionalist 
account of mental qualities avoids reference to phenomenology altogether.  So, even if there are reasons to accept 
that change as such appears in our conscious experience, this fact will have no bearing on our understanding of 
unconscious change perception.   
Secondly, it is difficult to understand what a quality space of changes would be like.  A change from red to green 
would have its own mental quality, as would a change from red to blue-green.  Every mental quality could change to 
every other in that modality.  The resulting quality space for visual mental qualities would have to be at least four-
dimensional.  And we would also have to account for changes across modalities.  Is a change from a blue pentagon 
that smells sour to a green circle that smells sweet more or less like a similarly complex multi-modal change?  It is 
not at all clear where to start in an answer to such a question. 
Arguably, what is going on in complex change comparisons does not count as perceptual discrimination at all.  
Instead, we make judgments about categories that we have identified the objects we are looking to belong to.  This 
means we left the perceptual domain to higher-order cognition.  This, along with the problematic appeal to 
phenomenology, renders the view that changes have their own mental qualities hard to accept. 
The better option is to think of representations of change in terms of relations between mental qualities.  
Relations are functions that take one or more things as relata.  For example, the relation ‘occurred before’ takes as 
its relata at minimum two events.  So, occurred before(World War 1, World War 2) specifies a particular relation 
between two events. 
Representation of change as a relation involves a two variable function f(x, y) that always takes two mental 
qualities from the same modality-specific quality space as its relata, e.g., f(red, green) or f(sweet, sour).  This 
function has a temporal ordering.  What makes f(red, green) distinct from f(green, red) is the temporal order of the 
occurrence of these particular mental qualities.  This very thing yields a version of the causal view that saves James’ 
original insight and does not come in conflict with what we know from neuroscience. 
As a reminder, what we know from neuroscience is that change can be perceived unconsciously.  This rendered 
the stronger constitutive version of the dependence relation between perceived change and subjective time 
problematic.  What was needed is an account of perceived change that does not rely on the way that change features 
in conscious experience.  We got such an account by extending some insights from a functionalist theory of mental 
qualities and specifying the structure of the content of the representations of change in terms of a relation. 
3.3. Awareness of time without consciousness 
We often make temporal discriminations by referencing changes in perceptible properties, such as color or 
sound.  We might perceive lightning as being before the thunder because we perceive the corresponding change in 
color in the sky to be before the change in sound.  Perceived changes play a similar role in our discriminations 
between durations of events.  This is perhaps at the heart of James’ observation about the dependence of subjective 
flow of time on awareness of change. 
Now we can better understand what that dependence amounts to.  The relations that feature in mental 
representations of change always specify a temporal order.  In other words, perceiving change from one mental 
quality to another has a temporal direction.   
Each mentally represented change is itself related to other such representations.  Formalising a bit, we could 
specify such relations in the following way:  f’( f(red, green), f(green, red)).  The result is a temporal ordering of 
color changes from red to green to red.  Similar iterations can specify indefinitely long sequences of orderings.  
Nestings of relations such as f’ define modality-specific, one-dimensional spaces of relations.  The relative 
temporal location of any single change can be characterized by its location in this space, each being either ‘before’ 
or ‘after’ any other.  These locations are the temporal qualities—timings and durations—that constitute our 
subjective flow of time. 
Timing qualities can be understood as the relative locations of individual changes.  So, for example, the 
perceived change at t1 might be before another perceived change at t2.  We can discriminate between them based on 
their distances from whatever we count as being the present moment. 
Duration qualities, on the other hand, can be characterized by the distances between any two timing qualities.  
One timing quality at t1 and another at t2 define a single duration quality.  We can discriminate between duration 
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qualities based on their dimensions on the one-dimensional temporal quality space. 
Temporal qualities reflect the relations between changes discriminated by an organism in the environment.  This 
means that temporal qualities are characterized in terms of their perceptual role not in terms of the way that one is 
aware of them subjectively.  So, again, we have an account of mental qualities—this time the temporal ones—that 
follows the basic insight of functionalist accounts of perception. 
3.4. Awareness of time with consciousness 
James’ original idea was about the subjective flow of time, that is, the conscious experience of dynamic and 
seamless passage from one moment to the next.  In the previous section we arrived at an account of temporal 
qualities without any reference to conscious experience.  So how do we get from those to subjective flow? 
The best answer, it seems, is to say that we become aware of our (sensory) mental states and the mental qualities 
that they have.  A venerable tradition in philosophy, which starts at least with Aristotle and continues until 
contemporary higher-order theories of consciousness, has given us a range of ways to understand how we become 
aware of our mental states.  We might sense them, think about them, be merely disposed to think about them, or 
have self-referring content feature in every conscious mental state. 
It is not my aim to weigh in on that debate or to choose one among the various options.  The main insight of that 
tradition is enough to make sense of how we get from unconscious representations of change to the subjective flow 
of time.  When we become aware of the temporal mental qualities that feature in our perceptions we become aware 
of the network of relations on the one-dimensional temporal quality space.   
The higher-order strategy can make sense of the dissociations between perception of change and subjective flow 
in a way in which the constitutive view cannot.  Take, for example, an instance of change blindness that results in 
priming.  In this case, change is being unconsciously represented, even though conscious experience presents us 
with no change at all. 
At the level of perception we have a representation of change that might look something like this:  f’( f(red, 
green), f(green, red)).  This representation is responsible for priming caused by the occurrence of green.  This could 
be measured by, say, reaction time differences.   
At the level of conscious experience we are aware of no change in color at all.  From one moment to the next it is 
just red and then some more red.  This would be reflected in the kind of verbal report that we would give if someone 
were to ask us what we saw.  We would likely say that we saw a bunch of red. 
Nonetheless, at some point in the past we were not looking at just red.  Perhaps we just sat down in front of the 
computer and at that time the screen was all grey so we are aware of f(gray, red).  Consequently we are consciously 
aware of some change, just not the most recent one.  We have a sense of the subjective flow of time, but only 
relative to that other change in the past that is ever receding into our subjective past. 
Subjective verbal reports about time inform us about such conscious perceptions of duration and timing.  These 
reports do not inform us, however, about the mechanisms that underlie these perceptions.  This is the reason that the 
constitutive version of James’ idea is untenable and the causal version attractive.   
4. Conclusion 
In this paper I defended a version of William James’ idea that the subjective flow of time depends on our 
awareness of change.  On the view presented here awareness of change may but need not occur consciously, which 
makes room for phenomena such as priming during change blindness.  Awareness of change involves mental 
representations of change that specify a one-dimensional space of relations.  This space defines temporal qualities, 
such as timing and duration. 
The view also offers a way to understand the relation between awareness of change and the subjective flow of 
time.  Subjective flow is the result of us becoming aware of the changes represented in our perceptions.  Since these 
changes specify temporal qualities, we thereby become aware of temporal qualities and the flow of time.  
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